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I INTRODUCTION
Recent litigation between the Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) and
the White House1 has brought a great deal of public attention to the
function of the attorney-client privilege in government.2 Although this
litigation has entailed unique factual circumstances, the White House's
assertion of the attorney-client privilege was quite ordinary, as other
federal government entities have asserted the privilege in past litigation.3
These cases raise an important issue of public policy: Should the
government be permitted to conceal evidence from a court and opposing
litigants by invoking an attorney-client privilege?
The courts and authorities are in near unanimous agreement that the
attorney-client privilege should generally be available to government
entities.4 However, the amount of judicial and academic commentary on
the governmental attorney-client privilege has been sparse.5 The purpose

1. See generally In re Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony) 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam) (addressing, inter alia, the question of whether a White House attorney can refuse to
provide information about possible criminal conduct to a federal grand jury on the basis of a
government attomey-clientprivilege),publishedinfuill,158 F.3d 1263, cert.denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.) (addressing, inter alia,
the question of whether a federal government entity can avoid complying with a federal grand jury
subpoena on the basis of the attorney-client privilege), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
2. See generally,e.g., Justices Refuse to Shield Lindsey, B. GLOBE, Nov. 10, 1998, at A26;
Ronald J. Ostrow & Elizabeth Shogren, Court Denies Bid to Block Lindsey Questioning, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 4,1998, atAl; Privilege:Congress'sTurn, WASH. POST, Nov. 13,1998, at A22; John
Solomon, No Shield for White House Lawyer: Chief Justice Refuses to Delay Grand Jury
Testimony, PEORIA J. STAR, Aug. 5, 1998, at A2.
3. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,149 (1975); Coastal States Gas
Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
Department ofAirForce, 566 F.2d 242, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Galarzav. United States, 179 F.R.D.
291, 295 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Ferrell v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 177 F.R.D. 425, 427,
431-32 (N.D. IUl. 1998); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 85 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
4. See, e.g., Lindsey 148 F.3d at 1104; Town of Norfolk v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d
1438, 1457 (1st Cir. 1992); Ferrell,177 F.R.D. at 432; FDIC v. Ernst & Whinney, 137 F.R.D. 14,
16 (E.D. Tenn. 1991); Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 520 (D. Del. 1980); Thill See.
Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133,138-39 (E.D. Wis. 1972); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.5.6, at 289-91 (1986); Ronald I. Keller, Note, The
Applicability and Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government, 62B.U.L.REv. 1003 (1982);UNIF.R.EVID.502(a)(1) (1974); FED.R. EVID.503(a)(1)
(Proposed 1973), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 235 (1972). But see Lory A. Barsdate, Note,
Attorney-ClientPrivilegeforthe Government Entity, 97 YALEL.J. 1725,1725 (1988); cf.Reed v.
Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 356 (6th Cir. 1998) (declining to decide whether governmental
attorney-client privilege was generally valid); GrandJurySubpoenaDucesTecum, 112F.3d at915
(same).
5. See 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENET W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACIiCE AND
PROCEDURE § 5475, at 124 n.5, 125 n.12 (1992).
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of this Note is to define and analyze the current state of the governmental
attorney-client privilege in the federal system. Furthermore, this Note
examines whether the underlying rationale of the attorney-client privilege
justifies a governmental privilege.6
Part II of this Note outlines the scope and rationale of the
attorney-client privilege. Additionally, Part II notes certain special issues
unique to entity clients and examines how these issues have been resolved
for the corporate privilege. Part I discusses the origin of the governmental
privilege in the federal system and how the lower federal courts have
developed the privilege. Part IV analyzes whether a governmental privilege
conforms to the rationale of the attorney-client privilege. This Note
concludes that while federal entities may have legitimate purposes for
wanting to maintain secrecy and engage in nondisclosure, the
attorney-client privilege is not a suitable legal doctrine for achieving those
ends.
IH.BACKGROUND

A. Policy and Scope of the Privilege
Definitions of the attorney-client privilege vary slightly,7 but Dean
Wigmore's description of the concept is the most frequently cited:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.'
The privilege is the oldest of its kind for confidential communications,
dating back to the reign of Elizabeth L9 Originally, its purpose was to
protect the oath and honor of the attorney, and the client was powerless to

6. Some courts use the term "governmental privilege" to refer to the deliberative process
privilege, which is a distinct and separate privilege from the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g.,
Green, 556 F. Supp at 84. This Note, for the sake of brevity, refers to the governmental
attorney-client privilege as the "governmental privilege."
7. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118; UNIF. R.
EvID. 502 (b) (1974); Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(b) (Proposed 1973); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357,358-59 (1950).
8. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
9. See id. § 2290, at 542.
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prohibit the attorney from waiving the privilege.'0
Since the late 1700s, the policy of the privilege has been "to promote
freedom of consultation" between client and attorney." In the Supreme
Court's words, the privilege encourages "full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients."' 2 The privilege protects all types of

communications including, inter alia, letters, faxes, documents, phone
conversations, and e-mails.13 To accomplish its purpose, the privilege bars
any compelled disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications,
absent the client's consent.' 4

The rationale for encouraging full disclosure is not to benefit the client;
rather, the privilege's objective is to "promote... observance of [the] law
and [the] administration of justice."' 5 For this objective to be achieved, the
privilege is founded upon three fundamental assumptions.16 First, the
complexities and uncertainties of the law require a client to consult with
an attorney to vindicate her rights and to comply with her obligations. 7
Second, full disclosure by the client enables the attorney to sift through the
facts and to give the client sound legal advice."8 The third, and most

controversial, assumption is that clients would not reveal personal,
unpleasant or embarrassing facts without the assurance that their attorney
could not be compelled to disclose those facts. 9
Lawyers widely believe the third assumption," despite a scarcity of
empirical evidence.2 ' Of course, if the third assumption is invalid, then the
10. See id. § 2290, at 543,545.
11. Id §2291,at545.
12. Swidler &Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081,2084 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 cmt. b. A
communication "is any expression through which a ...person undertakes to convey information
to another... and any document or other record revealing such an expression." Id. § 119.
14. See 8 WIGMORE, supranote 8, § 2291, at 545.
15. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
16. See RESTATEMENT HIMRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 cmt. c; WOLFRAM,
supra note 4, § 6.1.3, at 243.
17. See RESTATEMENT TMRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 cmt. c; see also
WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.1.3, at 243. The Supreme Court implicitly agreed with this
proposition by noting that corporate clients are required to frequently consult their lawyers because
of "the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modem corporation."
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
18. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 118 cmt. c; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.1.3, at 243.
19. See RESTATEMEN (TMIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 cmt. c; see also
WOLFRAM, supranote 4, § 6.1.3, at 243.
20. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTHELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS§ 118cmt c.
21. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.1.3, at 243 & n.7; see generally Note, Functional
Overlap between the Lawyers and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged
CommunicationsDoctrine,71 YALELJ. 1226 (1962) (noting that nonlawyers are far less likely to
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entire rationale for the privilege is undermined. To put it more plainly, if
the privilege does not encourage clients to consult an attorney and to make
full disclosures, then attorneys are unable to sift through the pertinent facts
to give sound legal advice, and the administration of justice is not
benefitted. Furthermore, the privilege only retains its deleterious effect: It
excludes relevant evidence from the finder of fact.22
To compensate for the speculative nature of the privilege, courts have
consistently held that the scope of the privilege should "be strictly confined
within the narrowest possible limits."' Moreover, the scope of the
privilege does not cover all communications between an attorney and the

client.' For example, the communication must be for the purpose of
seeking legal advice.' Courts have denied the privilege when a client seeks
business advice or other services from an attorney.'
Another requirement is that communication be confidential.27 To satisfy

the confidentiality requirement, the client must have a reasonable
expectation that only the attorney, and not any third party, will receive the
communication.' The privilege also protects communications made by a
client's agents or an attorney's agents, if they facilitate the rendering of
legal advice.29 For example, the privilege is not destroyed just because the
client's secretary types a letter for the client requesting legal advice.'
Additionally, the law only mandates that the communication, and not
its underlying facts, be confidential. 31 For example, suppose in a private
meeting with no other person present, a client tells her attorney, "John and
I saw Jack robbing the store." The underlying fact (Jack robbing the store)

believe the privilege encourages disclosure).
22. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.1.4, at 243-44; see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8,
§ 2291, at 554.
23. 8 WIGMORE, supranote 8, § 2291, at 554 &n.6; WOLFRAM, supranote4, § 6.1.4, at 244
& n.9.
24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFTHELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS § 119 cmt. b (noting
that communications through a public mode may not be sufficiently confidential to fall under the
privilege's protection).
25. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, §§ 2292,2296, at 554,566-67; RESTATEMENT (TImD)
OFTHELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 118,122.
26. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.3.2, at 251 & nn. 53-59; see also 25 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5475, at 133 & n.67. However, the legal advice sought may be for either
a nonlitigious or litigious purpose. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2295, at 565.
27. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, §§ 2292, 2311, at 554,599; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 118,121.
28. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2311, at 601-02; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121.
29. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8,§ 2311, at 601-02; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. e.
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. g.
31. See id. § 121 cmt. b (noting that the "matter communicated need not itself be secret").
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is obviously not confidential, because a third party (John) is also aware that
Jack robbed the store. Nonetheless, the communication (the client's
statement to the attorney) is protected, because no other person was present
when the client made the communication, giving the client a reasonable
expectation of secrecy. 2
Although the privilege protects communications, it does not protect the
underlying facts. 3 Using the same example, suppose a prosecutor asks the
client at Jack's trial, "Did you see Jack rob the store?" The client cannot
invoke the privilege, because the question involves a fact she observed.
However, if the prosecutor asks, "Did you tell your attorney that Jack
robbed the store?," then the client may invoke the privilege because the
question inquires into a communication she made to her attorney.'
Lastly, the traditional justification for the privilege has been to protect
communications from the client to the attorney, and not from the attorney
to the client. 35 However, due to practicalities, the privilege's scope includes
communications from the attorney to the client." Courts have rationalized
that disclosing an attorney's legal advice would have a tendency to reveal
the client's confidential communications.37 Nonetheless, the purpose of
protecting the attorney's 38communications is not to secure the attorney's
"freedom of expression."
B. The Privilegefor Entity Clients
1. Issues for Entity Clients
Traditionally, the attorney-client privilege sought to foster an attorney's
relation with a private individual.39 In the last century, though, courts began
to apply the privilege to both governmental and corporate entity clients.'
32. See id. § 121 cmt. b & c.
33. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 cmt.d.
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 cmt. d.
35. See Charles A. Miller, The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege,49 VA. L. REV.
262, 268 (1963).
36. See 8WIGMORE, supranote 8, § 2320, at 628-29; MCCORMICKONEVIDENCE§ 89, at 125
(John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
37. See 8 WIGMORE, supranote 8,§ 2320, at 628-29; MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 89, at

125.
38. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8,§ 2320, at 629.
39. See MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 88, at 124.
40. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.2, 6.5.6, at 283 & n. 69, 290-91 & nn.16-18
(collecting cases applying the privilege to corporations and governments). The United States
Supreme Court first acknowledged a corporate attorney-client privilege in United States v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad,236 U.S. 318,336 (1915). The first federal court decision to apply
the privilege to a government entity was United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 522-23 (D.
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In response, scholars and judges have examined some of the special issues
that arise when entities assert the privilege." There are at least three special
entity issues that courts need to resolve when assessing the scope and
merits of a governmental attorney-client privilege.4'
The first special issue is determining the identity of the client.43 Natural
persons communicate for themselves, but entities can only communicate
through their agents.' Therefore, courts must decide which of the entity's
agents are authorized to communicate for the entity and to seek legal
advice.45 For example, while most would probably agree that the corporate
president communicates for the client, courts must analyze whether
lower-level employees also communicate on behalf of the entity.' This
Note refers to this problem as the "client" issue.
Another aspect of the "client" issue is determining which agents of the
entity may invoke or waive the privilege.47 With private clients, the client
both makes the communication and has the power to waive or invoke the
privilege.48 When the client is an entity, it is possible that one agent (i.e.,
a lower-level employee) could make a privileged communication, but
another agent (i.e., a senior manager) could have the authority to invoke or
waive the privilege.49

A second issue is to what extent an entity may distribute
communications without violating the privilege's confidentiality
requirement.5" For example, should an attorney's legal opinion be
Colo. 1963).
41. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assoc., 207 F. Supp. 771,772-74 (N.D.
Ill. 1962), reh'g granted,209 F. Supp. 321, reversed 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding the
attorney-client privilege was not available to corporate clients because it was a personal privilege,
similar to the right of self-incrimination); James A. Gardner, A Personal Privilege for
Communications of CorporateClients-ParadoxorPublic Policy, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, 305-20,
371-93 (1963); James B. Kobak, The Uneven Application of Attorney-Client Privilege to
Corporationsinthe FederalCourts,6 GA. L.REV. 339,363-74 (1972); see generallyDavid Simon,
The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956); Note,
Attorney-Client Privilegefor CorporateClients: The ControlGroup Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424

(1970).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 43,50,51.
43. See Gardner, supranote 41, at 384-89; Kobak, supra note 41, at 362-71; Simon, supra
note 41, at 956-63.
44. See Kobak, supra note 41, at 362; Simon, supra note 41, at 956.
45. See id.; RESTATEMENT (TM=) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 cmt. d
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1,1996); Simon, supranote 41, at 956-63 (detailing possible agents that
could speak for a corporation).
46. Cf. Simon, supra note 41, at 956.
47. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 cmt. j.
48. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, §§ 2321,2327, at 629,634-35.
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 cmt. j.
50. See Gardner, supranote 41, at 386; Kobak, supra note 41, at 371-73; Simon, supra note
41, at 982-85.
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considered confidential if it is circulated to five hundred employees? If an
agent communicates facts that are widely known within the entity, should
the communication be protected? What if the facts are known outside the
entity? This Note refers to these problems as the "confidentiality" issue.
Lastly, and most importantly, courts ought to address whether an
attorney-client privilege actually encourages entities to make full
disclosures to counsel.5 1 As noted previously, one of the privilege's three
assumptions is that clients would not otherwise disclose personal,
unpleasant or embarrassing facts without the protection provided by the
privilege.52 This assumption, although lacking empirical support, 3 is
rooted in the history of the common law.54 However, the common law
privilege was based upon a natural person client, not an entity client.51 Just
because the assumption may have been valid for natural person clients does
not necessarily establish its validity for entity clients. Furthermore, if the
assumption is invalid, the privilege cannot accomplish its objective of
promoting the "observance of [the] law and [the] administration of
justice., '56 This Note refers to this issue as the "encouragement" issue.
2. Federal Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
Since both corporations and governments are entities, courts have relied
upon the law of the corporate privilege when construing the governmental
privilege. Prior to 1981, the lower federal courts had developed two
primary tests for the corporate privilege.5" The first test, known as the
"control group" test, limits the privilege to communications between the
lawyer and persons who have a managerial responsibility to respond and
take actions based upon the lawyer's advice.59 Therefore, the "control
group" could be different persons within the corporation for different legal
problems.' Additionally, for a communication to meet the confidentiality
requirement, its distribution must be limited to members of the control
51. See Gardner, supra note 41, at 328-338.
52. See supra text accompanying note 19.
53. See supra note 21.
54. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2291, at 545 ('The policy of the privilege has been
plainly grounded since the latter part of the 1700's on subjective considerations... to promote
freedom of consultation by legal advisers.").

55. See MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 88, at 124.
56. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981).
57. See, e.g, Galarza v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 291, 295 (S.D. Ca. 1998); SEC v.
World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 92 F.R.D. 65,66 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
58. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELER & LAIRD C. KRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.16, at 391
(1995); WOLFRAM, supranote 4, § 6.5.4, at 284.
59. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979); MUEUER &
KIRKPATRICK, supranote 58, § 5.16, at 391; WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.4, at 284.
60. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.4, at 284-85.
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group.6" Lastly, senior management maintains the power to invoke or
waive the privilege.62
The second test developed by the courts is known as the "subject
matter" test. 63 Under this test, any communication made by any employee
to the corporation's lawyer is protected, so long as it relates to the
performance of employment duties and was made for the purpose of
assisting the lawyer in rendering legal services to the corporation.6 Some
courts adopted a modified subject matter test, which requires that the
request for legal services originate with a superior officer and that further
dissemination of the communication be limited to those with a need for
such information.' This test also grants senior management the right to
invoke or waive the privilege.'
After years of debate about the merits of the two tests, the Supreme
Court reviewed Upjohn Co. v. United States.67 Upjohn had discovered
through an independent audit that one of its foreign subsidiaries had
possibly made illegal payments to foreign officials.' In response, Upjohn's
general counsel conducted an internal investigation. 69 As part of the
investigation, corporate attorneys interviewed various employees and sent
questionnaires to some of them.7' The chairman of the board directed
employees to cooperate with the attorneys, to fully disclose all information,
and to keep the communications confidential.7! During a subsequent
government investigation, the IRS issued a summons demanding that
Upjohn produce all files relating to the attorneys' internal investigation.72
Upjohn declined and eventually petitioned the Supreme Court for review.73
The Court rejected the control group test, although it did not expressly
adopt the subject matter test. 4 The Court rested its holding upon the strong
need of corporate counsel to obtain all the facts before rendering a sound

61. See Kobak, supra note 41, at 372.
62. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.4, at 286.
63. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 58, § 5.16, at 391; WOLFRAM, supra note 4,
§ 6.5.4, at 284.
64. See Harper& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487,491-92 (7th Cir. 1970), affid
by equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 58, § 5.16,
at 391-92.
65. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)(en bane);
WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.4, at 284.
66. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.4, at 286.
67. 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.4, at 285.
68. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 386-87.
71. See id. at 387.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 388.
74. See id. at 392-93.
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legal opinion to a corporation.7 5 In particular, the Court stressed that
Upjohn's superior officers directed the investigation in order to obtain
legal advice and that Upjohn's lower-level employees possessed all the
relevant information relating to the attorneys' legal advice.76 Without
disclosures by lower-level employees, management could not unearth the
pertinent facts and obtain a sound legal opinion for the corporate client.77
Conversely, if only disclosures by senior management were privileged,
then corporate counsel would be hampered in gathering legally relevant
facts from non-managerial employees. 7' Furthermore, attorneys would be
unable to give full and frank legal advice to lower-level employees who
implement corporate policy.79 Such encumbrances would "limit the
valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance
with the law. '
In regards to the "confidentiality" issue, the Court was unclear and
failed to explain to what extent communications must be kept confidential
within'the corporation to qualify for the privilege. However, the Court did
emphasize the fact that Upjohn's senior management had ordered all
employees to keep confidential the contents of their interviews with
corporate counsel.8 " Therefore, if a corporation treats a communication as
confidential, it can expect to receive the protection of the privilege. 2
On the "client" issue, Upjohn permits any corporate employee to speak
for the client, but the opinion appears to require that senior management
direct the lower-level employee to communicate with the lawyer.8"
Nevertheless, the Court did not alter the role of senior management as the
holder of the privilege." Thus, a lower-level employee's communications
may be protected, but senior management may choose to waive the
privilege and disclose the communication without the consent of the
employee. 5 Additionally, when faced with a subpoena for an employee's
communications, senior management, not the employee, decides whether
to assert the privilege.'
On the "encouragement" issue, the Upjohn model is possibly

75. See id at 392.
76. See id.at 394-95.

77. See id
78. See id.at 392.

79. See id.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
See id. at395&n.5.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 87.1, at 123.
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394
See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.4, at 287.

85. See id
86. See id.
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defective. 7 Because senior management may waive the privilege without
the employee's permission, the employee has no reason to believe that his
communication is confidential.8 " Therefore, the law does not provide an
incentive to the employee to make a full disclosure. 89 More likely, pressure
from upper management, as occurred in Upjohn, will encourage full
disclosure by lower-level employees rather than any incentive provided by
the attorney-client privilege.'
Despite this flaw, Upjohn's result can be defended, because it does
provide a legal incentive to senior managers and corporate counsel to
conduct internal investigations into corporate wrongdoing. 9 ' If internal
investigations were likely to be discoverable by government investigators
or opposing parties, senior managers might be inclined to ignore possible
wrongdoing rather than investigating and correcting illegal activity.' The
Court's rationale for granting a broad privilege to corporate entities was to
encourage corporate managers to seek counsel for the purpose of ensuring
the corporation's compliance with the law.93
Some commentators have criticized the Court's rationale as
unrealistic. 4 Nevertheless, lower federal courts must accept Upjohn, and
this Note does not aim to dispute Upjohn's rationale. Rather, this Note
attempts to explain the justification for a governmental privilege based
upon the Court's reasoning in Upjohn. Because the government is an
entity, similar to a corporation, Upjohn could be, and often is, construed
as controlling law for any government assertion of the privilege. A critical
question, therefore, is whether the attorney-client privilege provides a
similar incentive to government officials to seek counsel in order to ensure
that their government entity is complying with the law.
IlI. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Today, nearly all federal courts agree that government entities, like
natural persons and corporations, are entitled to an attorney-client
privilege.9' Despite agreement on the existence of a governmental

87. See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Considerationof the CorporateAttorney-Client
Privilege,57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443,466-67 (1982).
88. See id.
89. Cf. id. at 467.

90. Cf. id.
91. Cf generallyid. at 466-68.
92. Cf. id.
93. See Upjolm, 449 U.S. at 392-93.
94. See MUEUER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 58, § 5.16, at 396 n. 26 (collecting scholarly

criticism).
95. See supra note 4.
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privilege, no uniform rule as to its application exi3ts in the federal
system. 9 Currently, there is no Upjohn equivalent in which the Supreme
Court has delineated its view. Therefore, to determine the scope and merits
of the governmental privilege, one must examine lower court opinions.
A. Originsof the GovernmentalAttorney-Client Privilege

1. Freedom of Information Act
The governmental attorney-client privilege is not deeply rooted in the
common law.' Most of the federal case law concerning the privilege has
arisen out of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),9 s although there is
some scant evidence of a federal governmental privilege prior to FOIA's
enactment in 1967. 9 FOIA enables any citizen to request and to obtain
information from the government;" however, FOIA was not enacted as a
rule of discovery or evidence.1"' In spite of this, courts have looked to
FOIA for guidance as to the scope of the governmental privilege, even in

non-FOIA litigation.10 2

Until rather recently, government officials had little need for an
attorney-client privilege." 3 Under the Federal Housekeeping Act, officials
were empowered to adopt organizational regulations for government
agencies. " With this authority, agency heads created regulations
prohibiting subordinate officials from disclosing government documents

96. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.6, at 290-91.
97. See 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supranote 5, § 5475, at 124 & n.4.
98. See In re Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir.), published
infull, 158 F.3d 1263, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466.(1998). The Eight Circuit considered FOIA
attorney-client privilege law to be sui generis. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d 910,917 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 523 (D. Colo. 1963). The court
applied a standard for a corporate privilege, as set out in United States v. UnitedShoe Machinery
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), without discussion as to any distinction between corporate
and government entities. See id
100. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom ofInformationAct: A ShortCaseStudy in the Perils
andPaybacks of LegislatingDemocraticValues, 33 EMORY L.J. 649,655 (1984). The author has
served as Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and
has authored several FOIA opinions. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy,
617 F.2d 854 (1980).
101. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975).
102. See, e.g., Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593,597 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
103. See MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 108, at 152.
104. See MCCORMICK, supranote 36, § 108, at 152 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 822, R.S. § 161 (1875));
Don lively, GovernmentHousekeepingAuthority:BureaucraticPrivilegesWithoutaBureaucratic
Privilege, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 495,498 (1981).
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and from testifying, even when served with a court subpoena.10 5 The
Supreme Court twice upheld the validity of such regulations."°
In response, Congress amended the housekeeping statute in 1958 to
expressly state that officials were not authorized to withhold information
from the public.1 7 Congressional policy moved towards even greater
governmental openness with the passage of FOIA in 1967.0" The purpose
of the bill was to establish a policy favoring full agency disclosure of
information." Congress intended FOIA to make almost every document
generated by a government agency available to the public in one form or
another.1 As the Supreme Court elaborated, "[FOIA sought] to permit
access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view
and attempt[ed] to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure
such information from possibly unwilling official hands." '
During the committee hearings for FOIA, many government witnesses
expressed concern that unlimited public access to government documents
would inhibit a "full and frank exchange of opinions" among officials."1
As a result, Congress created Exemption 5,1 one of nine specific
exemptions that permitted government officials to shield documents from
the public." 4 The text of Exemption 5 protects against disclosure of "inter-

105. See Lively, supra note 105, at 498.
106. See United States ex. reL Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467-68 (1951); Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459,467-70 (1900).
107. See Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (1958) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 301
(1994)).
108. See MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 108, at 152.
109. See S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965).
110. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975).
111. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73,80 (1973).
112. See H.R. REP. 89-1497, at 10 (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418,2427.
113. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
114. Section 552(b) provides in relevant part:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(1) (A) specifically authorized under... an Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy... ;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute... ;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;
(6) personnel and medical files ... the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
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agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be

available by law to a party."...
Two particular provisions in the congressional reports have lent
credence to the argument that Congress intended to grant government
agencies an attorney-client privilege. 16 First, the Senate noted that
Exemption 5 "would include the working papers of the agency attorney
and documents which would come within the attorney-client privilege if
applied to private parties." 17 Second, the House stated Exemption 5 would
apply, unless the information "would routinely be disclosed to a private
party through the discovery process in litigation with the agency.""'
Neither the Senate nor the House detailed the proper scope of a
governmental privilege, although the Senate did state that it intended "to

delimit [Exemption 5] as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government
operation. '" 9

information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair
trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could
reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source
.... (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could
reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an
individual;
(8) ... reports prepared by... or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1994)
115. Id. § 552(b)(5).
116. The District of Columbia Circuit has stated in dicta that Congress did not intend to
"create" a governmental attorney-client privilege, but merely that Congress intended that the
"agencies should not lose the protection traditionally afforded through the evidentiary privileges."
In re Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100,1104-05 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Coastal States
Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980)), published infull, 158
F.3d 1263, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). The CoastalStates court cites no precedent for the
existence ofapre-FOIA governmental attorney-cient privilege. See CoastalStates Gas Corp., 617
F.2d at 862.
117. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 2. This comment was in response to an amendment to the bill. The
bill's previous language had only exempted material "'dealing solely with matters of law or
policy."' Id. at 1.
118. H.R. REP. 89-1497, reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418,2428.
119. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 9.
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2. Supreme Court FOIA Cases
FOIA encouraged citizens, advocacy groups, businesses, and other
organizations to flood government agencies with voluminous requests for
public disclosure of information.12° In response, government agencies often
refused disclosure by claiming one of the nine exemptions.12 ' EPA v.
Mink" was the Supreme Court's first opportunity to review a FOIA
request and an agency's Exemption 5 claim. In Mink, a group of House
members sued to obtain disclosure of documents relating to nuclear
weapon tests, and the government resisted by invoking Exemption 5.123 In
evaluating an Exemption 5 claim, the Court stated that the rules of
discovery should serve as "rough analogies. ' 24 However, the Court did not
address the attorney-client privilege directly.
FOIA' s passage also prompted a new litigation tactic: Parties who were
adverse to the government in judicial or administrative proceedings would
attempt to obtain evidence through FOIA requests, rather than through the
normal rules of discovery. 1" NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'26 involved
such a tactic, and it is the only opinion in which the Court comments on
the relation between the governmental attorney-client privilege and
Exemption 5.127
The case began as an administrative dispute between Sears and the
NLRB. Sears had filed a "charge" with the NLRB's Regional Counsel,
requesting a "complaint" be filed with the Board concerning an alleged
unfair labor practice. 29 The Regional Counsel denied Sears' request,
prompting Sears to make an administrative appeal to the General
Counsel."3 While preparing the appeal, Sears filed aFOIA request with the
NLRB for all "Advice and Appeals Memoranda issued within the previous
five years." 13 ' The memoranda were internal documents used by the
General and Regional Counsel staff in deciding whether to file
complaints. 32 The NLRB denied
Sears' FOIA request, and Sears sought
33
an injunction in federal court.1
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Wald, supra note 100, at 659-63.
See generallyid.
410 U.S. 73 (1973).
See id. at 75.

124. Id at 86.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Wald, supra note 100, at 666-67 & n.76.
421 U.S. 132 (1975).
See id at 148-49.
See id. at 143 n.10.
L
See id
l at 142-43.
See id at 139-42.
See id at 143 n.10.
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The NLRB argued that, as a government agency, Exemption 5 granted
three separate privileges: the attorney-client, work product, and
deliberative process privileges.1 4 The Court held that when enacting
Exemption 5,Congress had the deliberative process privilege and the work
product privilege "specifically in mind."135 In regards to the work product
privilege, the Court justified its holding by emphasizing the language in the
Senate report referring to the attorney-client privilege. 136 However, the
Court's disposition of the case rested upon the deliberative process and
work product privileges, not on the attorney-client privilege.' 37
The Sears Court never expressly stated that Exemption 5 incorporated
a governmental attorney-client privilege; nevertheless, such a reading of
the Sears opinion is plausible. 138 Subsequently, many lower courts have
cited Sears as precedent for the proposition that the government is entitled
to an attorney-client privilege,'39 even in cases not involving FOIA
requests." 4 Since Sears, the Court has not returned to the issue of a
governmental attorney-client privilege, leaving the lower courts to develop
the law.
B. Lower CourtDevelopment of the Governmental
Attorney-Client Privilege
Prior to Upjohn, the lower courts had thoroughly analyzed the corporate
privilege and fully developed two main theories.1 4' In contrast, the lower
courts' discussion of a government attorney-client privilege has been
limited. No cohesive doctrines have been developed for a governmental
privilege.
1. The Client Issue
The amount of case law discussing which agents speak for the
government is scarce. In one pre-Upjohn case, the District of Columbia
Circuit, in dicta, supported a governmental privilege akin to the corporate
control group test. 42 However, since Upjohn, the courts seem to simply
assume, without discussion, that any employee of a government agency
speaks for the agency, and therefore, those communications are protected
134. See idat 149. The Court referred to the "deliberative process privilege" as the "executive
privilege." See infra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
135. Sears,Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 150, 154.
136. See id.at 154.
137. See id.at 155-60.
138. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 6.5.6, at 290.
139. See Mead Data Cent. v. Department of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
140. See Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514,520 (D.Del. 1980).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
142. See Mead Data Cent., 566 F. 2d at 253 n.24.
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by the privilege.'43 Conversely, it is also assumed that only the government
entity, and not its individual employees, has the power to invoke or waive
the privilege.144
One court has discussed which government employees speak for the
client. 145 Galarzav. UnitedStatesinvolved a suitbrought under the Federal
Torts Claim Act (FrTCA).' 46 The plaintiff had undergone surgery at a Navy
hospital and alleged that two Navy physicians had been negligent in
removing her uterus. 47 Under the FTCA, the United States, and not the
physicians, was the named defendant.'"' In preparation for the suit, the U.S.
Attorney's Office conducted ex parte communications with the physicians,
and the plaintiff sought disclosure of those communications. 49 The United
States refused, invoking the attorney-client privilege. 50
The district court ruled that Upjohn was on point.'' The government
was no different than a corporation being sued for the tortious acts of its
employees. 52 Moreover, the government could only function through its
employees.' 53 In the court's view, government attorneys, like corporate
attorneys, needed "full and frank disclosure" from government employees
in order to give sound legal advice to the client, the United States. 54 The
court made no distinction between government service and corporate
employment. 5 A survey of cases indicates that most courts implicitly
agree with Galarza
and permit nearly any government employee to speak
15 6
for the client.
143. See, e.g., Town of Norfolk v. Army Corps of Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438, 1457 (holding
that the Corps of Engineer was a "client" of the U.S. Attorney's Office without analyzing which
officers on the Corps could speak for the government); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 85 (N.D.
Ind. 1982) (stating "privilege... unquestionably is applicable to the relationship between
Government attorneys and administrative personnel").
144. Cf. Clavir v. United States, 84F.R.D. 612,614(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holdingthatFBI agents,
being personally sued, could not invoke the work product privilege to conceal interviews with
Justice Department attorneys because the government held the privilege). The Restatement's view
is that the"responsible public official" has the power to assert the privilege. RETATEmENT (THIRD)
OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 cmt e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
145. See 179 F.R.D. 291,294-96 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
146. See id at 292.
147. See id. at 292-93.
148. Seeid. at293.
149. See id
150. See id
151. Seeid at295.
152. See id.
153. See id
154. Id

155. See id.
156. See, e.g., supranote 144; SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invest., 92 F.R.D. 65, 66 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (citing Upjohn as support for protecting staff memoranda); United States v. Anderson, 34
F.R.D. 518,522-23 (D. Colo. 1963) (assuming, withoutdiscussion,that"administrativepersonnel"
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2. The Confidentiality Issue
As noted previously, the common law only required that the
communication, and not its underlying facts, be confidential."5 7 Therefore,
even though third parties may be fully aware of a communication's factual
content, the communication may still be confidential, so long as there was
a reasonable expectation of secrecy.15 In contrast, the District of Columbia
Circuit has held that, for the governmental attorney-client privilege, (1) the
communication must be confidential and (2) "the communication [must
be] based on confidential information. 1' 59 The court's use of the word
"information"16 is equivalent to requiring the underlying fact to be
confidential. 0
In Mead Data Central v. Departmentof Air Force,the Air Force had
negotiated a licensing agreement for a computerized legal research system
with West Publishing, a business rival of the plaintiff.161 The plaintiff filed
a FOIA request for all documents relating to the computer system. 6 The
Air Force complied with part of the request, but claimed the attorney-client
privilege for three documents because they were legal opinions from Air
Force attorneys to superior officials. 63 Two of the documents advised the
Air Force about copyright and licensing issues.' One of the documents set
forth a legal opinion and the background facts for the negotiations. 6
The circuit court rejected the Air Force's claims."6 While
acknowledging the Air Force's right to an attorney-client privilege, the
court held that the Air Force had not met its burden of showing the
documents to be confidential.' 67 To invoke a governmental attorney-client
privilege, the information upon which a communication was based had to

in SBA can communicate for the client); see also Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57
F.R.D. 133,138-39 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (assuming attomey-clientrelationship between two agencies).
157. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
159. Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233,245 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see alsoCoastal States Gas
Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mead Data Cent. v.
Department of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
160. See Coastal Gas States Corp., 617 F.2d at 863; MeadData Cent., 566 F.2d at 263-64
(McGowan, J. dissenting).
161. See Mead Data Cent., 566 F.2d at 248.

162. See id.
163. See id. The Air Force claimed that four other documents were protected by the
deliberative process privilege. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 253-54, 255.
167. Seeid.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss4/5

18

Gowdy: Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-Client Privilege?
GOVERNMENTATrORNEY-CLIENTPRIVILEGE

be confidential.'(' Because the Air Force had possiblyrevealed information
contained in the legal opinions to West during the negotiations, the
opinions were not necessarily confidential.169 On remand, the Air Force
were free of information known to
had to show that the legal opinions
170
West or any other third party.
Judge McGowan, in dissent, recognized that by requiring the
underlying "information" to be confidential, the majority was actually
requiring the communication's facts to be confidential."7 In a subsequent
FOIA case, another panel of the court agreed by stating the privilege was
"limited to protection of confidential facts."1 72 Judge McGowan viewed the
majority's opinion as a significant alteration of the traditional
attorney-client privilege.7 3 He argued: "In the vast majority of cases,
attorney-client discussions concern the client's dealings or relationship
with one or more third parties. The mere fact that those third parties are
aware of the factual details of their interaction with the client cannot
automatically defeat a claim of confidentiality." 74 Judge McGowan was
correct. The majority's confidentiality requirement was clearly contrary to,
and more narrowly defined than, the common law attorney-client privilege
as developed by Wigmore and others. 75
Although the Mead Data majority departed from the common law,
most federal courts have followed its reasoning, even in non-FOIA
cases. 176 A key factual issue to the courts is whether the communication
"comment[s] or report[s] on information coming from persons outside the
government or from public documents."' 177 For example, in Jupiter
PaintingContractingCo. v. United States, a taxpayer sued the IRS for a
refund and abatement of federal employment withholding taxes. 17' The
taxpayer moved to compel discovery of IRS legal memoranda that

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See iL at 254.
See id. at 255.
See id. at 254.
See it. at 263-64 (McGowan, J. dissenting).
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,863 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
See Mead Data Cent., 566 F.2d at 263-64 (McGowan, J. dissenting).

174. Il at 264 (McGowan, J. dissenting).
175. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593,598 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Community Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 68 F.R.D. 378,382 (E.D.
Wis. 1975); United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 522-23 (D. Colo. 1963). But see FDIC v.
Ernst & Whinney, 137 F.R.D. 14 (E.D. Tenn. 1991); FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 131
F.R.D. 595 (M.D. Fla. 1990). In these two cases, the courts permitted the FDIC to invoke the
attorney-client privilege for criminal investigative reports, which undoubtedly were based upon
information from outside the agency.
177. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. at 523.
178. See JupiterPainting,87 F.R.D. at 595.
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discussed an agency decision not to prosecute the taxpayer.1 79 The district
court rejected the IRS's assertion of attorney-client privilege, because the
memoranda were based upon factual information gained from witnesses
outside of the government."s
Besides examining whether a communication's underlying inf6rmation
is confidential, courts also inquire into whether the communication itself
was confidential."8 ' In CoastalStates Gas Corp. v. Departmentof Energy,
the plaintiff made a FOIA request for legal memoranda sent from the
Energy Department's regional counsel to field auditors.1 82 The Energy
Department admitted that the memoranda had been widely circulated to
employees within the department, but argued that the attorney-client
privilege should apply because the memoranda had been kept within the
department. 8 3 The circuit court rejected this argument and held that the
Energy Department had no basis for a claim of confidentiality, because the
memoranda had been "made known to persons other than those who
need[ed] to know."' ' 8 By limiting access to those officials with a need to
know, the court essentially adopted part of the modified subject matter
test.185 Other federal courts have also required that the distribution be
limited to select
officials in order to satisfy the confidentiality
186
requirement.
3. The Encouragement Issue
Courts rarely address whether the attorney-client privilege actually
encourages government entities to make full disclosures, thereby enabling
government counsel to sift through the facts and give sound legal advice
to the government entity. Rather, courts simply accept the assumption,
without analysis, that the privilege will encourage "full and frank
discussion" between the government attorney and client.8 7

179. See id. at 595-96.
180. See id. at 598. In a factually similar case, another court reached the opposite conclusion
and permitted the attorney-client privilege. See Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 85-86 (N.D. Ind.
1982) (holding that the IRS did not have to disclose an interattorney letter requesting that a

taxpayer be subject to legal proceedings).
181. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863-64 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514,521 (D. Del. 1980).
182. See Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 857-58.
183. See i.at 863.

184. Id.
185. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 489, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
Covington & Burling v. Food & Nutrition Serv., 744 F. Supp 314, 323 (D.D.C 1990); Coastal
Corp., 86 F.R.D. at 521. Butsee Badran v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 1437,1440 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(permitting privilege claim just because document had been kept within the agency).

187. Mead Data Cent. v. Department of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see
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While not addressing this assumption directly, the Eighth Circuit made
forceful arguments for disputing its rationale. 88 In In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, the OIC, as part of its Whitewater investigation,
issued a subpoena for notes generited by White House counsel during an
interview with the First Lady." 9 The White House resisted the subpoena,
invoking the attorney-client privilege. 190One of the White House's central
arguments was that the court should adopt Upjohn as the model for a broad
governmental attorney-client privilege. 9 ' According to the White House,
Upjohn emphasized "the importance of the attorney-client privilege in
encouraging full and frank... legal advice" to corporate clients, and
government clients should have at least the same benefits as corporate
clients."9 However, the Eighth Circuit refused to adopt an Upjohn model,
citing two key distinctions between government and corporate clients.193
First, the court stated that the White House could not be subject to any
criminal liability, unlike corporations which may suffer both criminal and
civil liability due the actions of their agents. 94 Second, the court
emphasized that government employees have a "general duty of public
service," which "favor[s] disclosure over concealment."' 95 The court noted
that all executive branch employees have a statutory duty to report criminal
wrongdoing.196 Furthermore, the court found the difference between the
private interest of a corporation and the public interest of a government
agency to be so substantial that it was reason enough not to apply Upjohn
to a government client.1" Nevertheless, the court declined to decide
whether the attorney-client privilege is generally available to government
clients and narrowed its ruling to denying the existence of a governmental

also, e.g., Galarza v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 291, 295 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Coastal Corp., 86
F.R.D. at 520.
188. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
189. See id. at913.
190. See id. at 913-14. The White House also claimed executive and work product privileges,
but it abandoned the executive privilege on appeal. See id. The First Lady intervened in her
personal capacity, arguing that the notes should be privileged under the common-interest doctrine.
See id. at 914. The court rejected the work product and common-interest doctrine arguments. See
id. at 922, 923, 924.
191. See id. at 919-20.
192. Id. at 920.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Il
196. See id. The relevant statute is 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994), which provides that "[a]ny
information... received in a department or agency of the executive branch of the Government
relating to violations of title 18 involving Government officers and employees shall be
expeditiously reported to the Attorney General."

197. See id.
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privilege in criminal grand jury proceedings.19
The District of Columbia Circuit also recognized substantial differences
between public service and corporate employment.199 In In re Lindsey
(Grand Jury Testimony), the Deputy White House Counsel refused to
answer grand jury questions on grounds that his communications with the
President were protected under the attorney-client privilege.' While
acknowledging the existence of a governmental attorney-client privilege,
the court's 2holding
abrogated the privilege in a criminal grand jury
1
proceeding.

0

Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the court's opinion focused on the duties that
distinguish a government lawyer,not a government client.2° 2Nevertheless,
many of the public duties mentioned by the court are equally applicable to
government agencies and their senior officials. 3 For example, the court
noted that all members of the executive branch take a constitutional oath
to "take [c]are that the [flaws be faithfully executed." 2 4 Additionally, the
court emphasized that public officials must be attentive to the importance
of "having transparent and accountable government."20 5 The court stressed
Madison's concept of open government and noted "openness in
government has always been thought crucial to ensuring that the people
remain in control of their government." 2°6
Neither of the cases involving the White House and OIC directly
examine the "encouragement" issue.' However, these cases do show that
government entities are quite distinguishable from private and corporate
entities.' The primary difference is that officials within a government
entity have-public duties unlike their counterparts in the corporate world. 9
The courts found these distinctions to be sufficient enough to warrant
abrogation of the attorney-client privilege in a criminal context.210

198. Seeid. at915,921.
199. Seeln reLindsey(GrandJuryTestimony), 148 F.3d 1100,1108-11 (D.C. Cir.),published
infull, 158 F.3d 1263, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
200. See id. at 1103.
201. See id. at 1102,1105.
202. See generally id.at 1108-1111.
203. See infranotes 205-07 and accompanying text.
204. In re Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d at 1108 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 3).
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id at 1109.
Id. at 1109-10 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729,745 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
See supra text accompanying notes 189-207.
See supra text accompanying notes 195-97, 205-07.
See supra text accompanying notes 195-97, 200, 205-07.
See supra notes 199, 202 and accompanying text.
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4. Summary
Generally, federal government entities may refuse to disclose evidence

by invoking the common law attorney-client privilege except in the context
of a criminal proceeding." For most courts, the communication need not

originate from the agency's senior officials. 1 Rather, communications of
all government employees are protected along the same lines as Upjohn
protected communications of lower-level corporate employees. 1
Nonetheless, the agency still retains the right to invoke or assert the
privilege. 4 To meet the confidentiality requirement, the communication's
underlying facts must be unknown to third parties,2 5 and the
communication itself must have a limited distribution to those officials
with a "need to know. '216 Lastly, most courts have failed to analyze the
noted pertinent
"encouragement" issue, but two courts of appeals have
217
distinctions between private and government clients.
C. OtherPrivileges

Before examining whether public policy supports a governmental
attorney-client privilege, it is important to note that the attorney-client
privilege is just one of many privileges available to a government
litigant. Some of the privileges currently available to the government are
the work product privilege, 2 9 the deliberative process privilege,'

the

211. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,149 (1975); Coastal States Gas
Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 858 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Griffith v. Davis, 161
F.R.D. 687,698 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514,519-21 (D. Del. 1980).
220. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Department of Air Force, 566 F. 2d 242,248 (D.C.
1998);
Cir. 1977); Ferrell v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 177 F.R.D. 425, 431 (N.D. Ill.
Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 489, 496-500 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The deliberative
process privilege encourages agency officials to provide decision-makers with frank and honest
opinions without the fear of subsequent public disclosure and ridicule. See generallyRussell L.
Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The DeliberativeProcessPrivilege,54 MO. L. REV. 279 (1989). The
privilege protects "predecisional" and "deliberative" communications, but is subject to a balancing
test. Id. at 290-98.
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presidential privilege,2' the state secrets privilege,' fthe investigative file
privilege,"3 and the bank examination privilege.' Except for the work
product privilege, all of these privileges have been tailored to meet special
needs for government secrecy, while balancing other interests such as open
government.' In contrast, the historical development of the attorney-client
privilege has no roots in the government's need for secrecy.'
Furthermore, many legal opinions and documents are protected under
either the work product privilege or the deliberative process privilege. 7
The purpose of the deliberative process privilege is to encourage agency
officials to provide decision-makers with frank and honest opinions
without the fear of subsequent public disclosure and ridicule.' Subject to
a ' balancing test, the deliberative process privilege protects
communications that are part of "the give-and-take of the consultative
process," including legal opinions.229 The work product privilege protects
a lawyer's materials prepared in anticipation of trial, unless the opposing
2
party can demonstrate a "substantial need" and an "undue burden." 9
Additionally, the work product privilege provides a high-level of
protection
against disclosure of a lawyer's mental impressions or legal
231
strategy.
IV.

ARGUMENTS

AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL

ATrORNEY-CuENT PRIVILEGE

The attorney-client privilege should not be applied to government
entities for two policy reasons. First, the possibility that the privilege
encourages public officials to consult with counsel is too speculative.
Second, the privilege is an inappropriate means for balancing the

221. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d
729,745 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
222. See MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 107, at 150-51.

223. See id. § 108, at 153.
224. See Schreiber v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 11 F.3d 217, 220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
225. See MCCORmICK, supranote36,§§ 107,108, at 151-53 (discussing policies and interests
for various governmental privileges).
226. See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2290, at 542-45 (failing to mention any
governmental attorney-client privilege).
227. See Mead Data Cent. v. Department of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 n.28 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (discussing overlap of attorney-client and deliberative process privileges); MELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 58, § 5.31, at 460-61 (discussing overlap of attorney-client and work
product privileges); see also Barsdate, Note, supra note 4, at 1742-43.
228. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
229. Id.
230. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
231. See Ui; MUELLER& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 58, § 5.31, at 460-61
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competing policies of open government and government secrecy.
Additionally, the legislative history of FOIA and Exemption 5 does not
mandate a governmental attorney-client privilege. 2
A. The EncouragementIssue
Dean Wigmore, an advocate of the privilege, recognized that the
benefits of the privilege were "speculative," even when the client was a
natural person.233 The Upjohn model for a corporate privilege is even more
speculative. As noted previously, there is no incentive for a lower-level
employee to confide in counsel when senior officers hold the privilege.2"
This flaw in Upjohn's reasoning is equally germane to government clients.
However, Upjohn had some merit because it provided an incentive to
senior corporate management to consult counsel in order to correct
wrongdoing and comply with the law.23 Without a similar incentive to
senior government officials, the Upjohn model cannot be justified.
Because of the differences between public service and corporate
employment, any possible incentive that the privilege would provide to
government officials is far too speculative. Public service requires a
commitment to honesty, open government, and doing justice;1 6 conversely,
corporate employment requires a commitment to perform in the best
interests of a corporation and its shareholders. 7 This key distinction is
exemplified by the fact that government officials, unlike their corporate
counterparts, have a constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. 238 Of
course, one could argue that corporate officers are also under a duty to
correct wrongdoing, because of the duty of care that they owe shareholders,
and thus do not need any incentive to comply with the law. Whatever the
merits of this argument may be, a constitutional duty is obviously greater
than any fiduciary duty created by state law. Furthermore, government
officials, but not corporate officers, are also under a statutory duty to report
wrongdoing.239
Therefore, if a public officer is unsure about the complexities and

232. See infra text accompanying notes 250-52.
233. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, §2291, at 554.
234. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
236. See In re Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100, 1104-08 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), publishedinfull, 158 F.3d 1263, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); Reed v. Baxter, 134
F.3d351,356 (6th Cir. 1998); In re GrandJury Subpoena DucesTecum, 112F.3d 910,920-21 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 2482 (1997).
237. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OFCORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01(a).
238. See Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1108.
239. See GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920.
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uncertainties of the law, she will probably consult a lawyer, not because of
the attorney-client privilege, but because an essential part of her job is to
comply with the law.?' The District of Columbia Circuit chose to draw a
distinction between criminal and non-criminal cases. However, public
servants are charged with complying with all laws, criminal and civil2'1
Common sense dictates that even if no attorney-client privilege existed,
government officials would still consult attorneys to ensure that their
agencies were following the law.242
B. Open Government
Unlike corporations, federal agencies must comply with a policy of
open government.u3 This policy has been expressed in many writings of
the Framers and in the legislative history of FOIA.2 4 Privileges are in
direct conflict with open government?' 5
Despite a policy of openness, the government undoubtedly requires a
degree of secrecy in order to govern efficiently.m Even the Founding
Fathers recognized the importance of secrecy by conducting closed
meetings during the Constitutional Convention.2 7 As a result, the law has
created a series ofprivileges that recognize the government's special needs
for secrecy."8 For example, the deliberative process privilege allows
government officials to make frank recommendations on policy.' 9 Many
legal opinions would be protected under this privilege." 0 Of course, the
government does more than govern; it also litigates. Government lawyers
need confidentiality when preparing strategies for upcoming litigation. The
work product privilege serves this need by protecting an attorney's mental
impressions.21
Using the attorney-client privilege to serve the government's needs for
secrecy is like hammering a square peg into a round hole. The attorneyclient privilege just does not fit a government client. A prime example is
240. Cf. Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1104-08; Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at
920-21.
241. Cf. GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920-21; Reed, 134 F.3d at 356.
242. This observation comes in part from the author's own experience in government, which
was not as a lawyer.
243. Cf., e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
244. See Wald, supra note 100, at 650-54.
245. See Reed, 134 F.3d at 356; see also In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d
at 920.
246. See Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974).

247. See a
248.
249.
250.
251.

See supra notes 220-25.
See supra note 221.
See supra note 221.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 58, § 5.32, at 468.
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the Mead Data decision, which narrowed the scope of the common law
privilege by requiring that, when the government is the client, a
communication's underlying facts must be confidential in order for the
communication to be protected. 2 Mead Data and other decisions are
understandable, for judges probably intuitively fear that applying the
common law confidentiality requirement would permit government
agencies to shield too much information from the public, especially when
every agency is inundated with lawyers. However, tinkering with the
attorney-client privilege is the wrong method for combating this problem.
Courts do need to balance the government's need for secrecy with the
policy of open government, but developing other privileges, rather than
distorting the common law attorney-client privilege, is a more suitable
means for balancing these competing policies.
C. Legislative History
For a court to abrogate the governmental attorney-client privilege, it
must explain the rather explicit legislative history of FOIA. The Senate
report accompanying FOIA stated Exemption 5 "would include . . .
documents which would come within the attorney-client privilege if
applied to private parties."" The language appears to mandate a
governmental attorney-client privilege.
However, when FOIA was passed in 1967, there was only one case in
which a court discussed a governmental attorney-client privilege.5'
Because of a lack of developed case law and the obvious differences
between entity and individual clients, Congress would have provided
specific guidelines if it intended to extend all the rights of the
attorney-client privilege to government. Additionally, the Senate FOIA
report also stated that Exemption 5 should be construed as narrowly as
possible to allow the government to conduct "efficient [g]overnment
operation[s]."" 5 Lastly, the federal rules of evidence direct that courts
formulate privilege rules "in light of reason and experience. ' ' 6 Based on
all of the foregoing, FOIA's legislative history does not mandate that
courts adopt a governmental attorney-client privilege.
V. CONCLUSION

The federal government should not be permitted to conceal evidence by
invoking an attorney-client privilege, because the privilege's rationale fails
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See supra text accompanying notes 169, 172-76.
S. REP. No. 89-813, at 2.
See United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 523 (D. Colo. 1963).
S. REP. No. 89-813, at 9.
FED. R. EviD. 501.
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when the client is the government. Applying the privilege to an entity is
difficult, but possible, when the entity is a corporate client. However, the
government is not a corporation, and the differences between public
service and corporate employment warrant abrogating the governmental
attorney-client privilege. While the government may have legitimate needs
for confidentiality and secrecy, the rationale of the attorney-client privilege
is not an appropriate method for achieving those needs.
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